The Self Is Not Where You Think It Is
What anaesthesia research and direct inquiry suggest about the same question
In late 2023, researchers at MIT’s Picower Institute for Learning and Memory published a finding that deserves more attention than it received outside neuroscience.
Recording from electrode arrays across four regions of the cortex in two macaque monkeys, from primary sensory areas through to the prefrontal cortex, they measured what happens when propofol anaesthesia is administered. What they found was not what most people assume happens when consciousness disappears.
The lights do not simply go out.
Sensory signals, sounds and gentle touch, still arrive at the brain. Primary sensory cortex still registers them. Neural activity continues. What stops is the propagation of those signals: information reaches the first station and goes no further. As lead investigator Earl Miller put it, “the cortex isn’t getting on the same page. Information is making it to the cortex.” ¹ It just stops being assembled into anything.
This sits within a larger picture. A foundational 2008 review in Science by Alkire, Hudetz and Tononi argued that anaesthetic agents work not by shutting the brain down wholesale, but by disrupting its capacity to integrate information across regions, to bind separate streams of processing into unified experience. ² And in 2024, the same MIT labs showed that propofol tips the cortex out of the delicate balance of stability and excitability that coherent processing depends on: the dynamics themselves destabilise, across the cortex, and unified experience goes with them. ³
The picture that emerges is consistent, and it is strange. Experience is not a given that a brain simply has. It is assembled, moment by moment, by an integrating process. Interrupt the process, and there is no experience left over, and no one left waiting for it to resume.
The neuroscientists are circling a question they can only approach from the outside: what assembles experience, and what happens when the assembling stops?
The Moments Awake inquiry has been asking a neighbouring question from the inside for twelve years. Not about experience as a whole, but about one very specific piece of it: the sense of being a separate someone.
What the Inquiry Finds
The inquiry does not begin with neuroscience, and it makes no claims about the brain. It begins with direct observation.
In session, practitioners are asked to look at the felt sense of being a separate self. Not to think about it, but to trace it as it actually appears in experience. What they consistently find is not an object. There is no homunculus behind the eyes. There is no stable, persistent entity that can be located and examined.
What can be found, directly, is a process. A movement. And that movement has a specific shape.
It begins with rejection.
Not rejection in the dramatic sense. The rejections that sustain the conditioned self are micro, habitual, almost imperceptible. A moment’s resistance to what is happening. A quiet no directed at This, at the moment as it is: this sound, this feeling, this quality of the morning. Rejection, resistance, emotion, narrative. And at the end of that chain, the Occupant: the sense of a separate someone, arising as the output of the process while presenting itself as its author.
This is the mechanism the inquiry is designed to interrupt.
The Occupant Is Not the Experiencer. It Is What the Rejection Produces.
This is the central observation of Moments Awake, and it is testable in direct experience.
Sit quietly for a moment and notice: is there a self present right now? Most people, asked this directly, will report something like yes, of course, and locate it somewhere behind the face, behind the eyes. A kind of inner witness.
Now look more carefully. Is that witness stable? Or does it flicker: more present in some moments, less in others, almost absent in deep absorption or sudden clarity?
What practitioners report, consistently, is that the sense of a separate self is not a continuous fact. It arises. And when it arises, it arises in the company of a rejection or an attachment. In every instance examined across twelve years of sessions, this inquiry has not found an exception.
In the complete absence of rejection and attachment, when nothing present is being refused and nothing absent is being reached for, the sense of a separate someone does not arise. Not because it has been suppressed or transcended, but because there is nothing for it to build itself from.
This is not a philosophical position. It is a report from direct observation, repeated across years of sessions with ordinary people who were not seeking a spiritual attainment. They were looking to understand why they kept feeling the way they felt.
The Crucial Difference
It would be easy to draw the parallel too tightly, so let it be drawn honestly.
Anaesthesia removes experience wholesale. When the integrating process stops under propofol, everything goes with it: sensation as experienced, the world, the moment itself. What remains is a functioning body and no experience at all.
The inquiry finds something different, and in the respect that matters, something opposite. When the mechanism of rejection and attachment falls quiet, experience does not disappear. It clarifies. The sound of rain is still here. The body is still here, responding with its ordinary intelligence. What is absent is only the overlay: the commentary, the contraction, the sense of a separate someone managing it all. Practitioners describe the result not as blankness but as ease, a quality this work calls resonant ease, the body’s natural condition when it is neither braced against what is present nor reaching for what isn’t.
The drug demonstrates that unified experience is assembled and can stop. The inquiry demonstrates something the drug never could: that within waking experience, the self-sense specifically is assembled, and can stop, while experience continues. Anaesthesia is the absence of experience. This is experience without the middleman.
That is why the two findings rhyme without being the same finding. Both show a process where common sense assumes an object. Both show that when the generating process is interrupted, what it generates simply does not arise: no diminished self, no self in waiting. But only one of them can be lived.
There is, as it happens, research that comes closer to the inquiry’s actual territory. Studies of experienced meditators show reduced activity in the brain’s default mode network, the midline regions most associated with self-referential processing, precisely during practices that quieten the sense of self while leaving awareness intact. ⁴ And in philosophy of mind, Thomas Metzinger has argued on independent grounds that the self is not an entity but a transparent, self-sustaining process that the system mistakes for a thing. ⁵ From the inside, the inquiry would put it more plainly: the Occupant is not pretending to be the self. It is the pretense.
In Practice
In an inquiry session, the question is never philosophical. It is always immediate.
Where do you feel this in the body? What is the rejection in this moment? What is being refused, not in the story, but right now, in the body?
The shift that happens when a practitioner finds the rejection, not thinks about it but actually locates the precise no that is generating the current contraction, is not a change in belief. The story does not resolve. The circumstances do not change. What changes is the mechanism’s visibility.
And what is clearly seen cannot sustain itself in the same way.
The Occupant runs on invisibility. This is what twelve years of sitting with people has shown, one session at a time: the conditioned self sustains itself by not being seen. What the inquiry does is bring it into view. Not to fight it, not to fix it. To see it. In that seeing, the energy that would have become resistance has nowhere to go, and the downstream doesn’t run.
Neither the laboratory nor the inquiry is the recognition itself. The neuroscience observes the machinery from outside and can say nothing about what it is like when the self-sense clears; the inquiry works from inside and needs no claims about the brain, because everything it points to can be checked directly, in the middle of an ordinary day. Where the two descriptions meet is a genuinely interesting question. What can be said is that they point, from opposite sides, at the same structure: the self you take yourself to be is a process, not an object. A process, unlike an object, can be seen.
And seeing is where the inquiry begins.
Moments Awake® is a practical self-inquiry developed by Joseph Scott. The Occupant: A Practical Guide to Self-Inquiry is coming 2026.
To explore the inquiry directly, see Work With Joseph.
References
¹ Tauber, J., Brincat, S.L., Stephen, E.P., Donoghue, J.A., Kozachkov, L., Brown, E.N. & Miller, E.K. (2024). Propofol-mediated unconsciousness disrupts progression of sensory signals through the cortical hierarchy. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 36(2), 394–413. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_02081
² Alkire, M.T., Hudetz, A.G. & Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness and anesthesia. Science, 322(5903), 876–880. doi:10.1126/science.1155579
³ Eisen, A.J., Kozachkov, L., Bastos, A.M., Donoghue, J.A., Mahnke, M.K., Brincat, S.L., Chandra, S., Tauber, J., Brown, E.N., Fiete, I.R. & Miller, E.K. (2024). Propofol anesthesia destabilizes neural dynamics across cortex. Neuron, 112(16). PMID: 39013467
⁴ Brewer, J.A., Worhunsky, P.D., Gray, J.R., Tang, Y.-Y., Weber, J. & Kober, H. (2011). Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity and connectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(50), 20254–20259. doi:10.1073/pnas.1112029108
⁵ Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.